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TITLE VII-SPOUSAL PREGNANCY BENEFITS-DIFFEREN-
TIAL TREATMENT OF SPOUSAL BENEFITS VIOLATES TITLE 
VII. Newport News Shipbmlding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 
2622 (1983). 
To comply with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 
1978,1 which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,2 an employer 
expanded its health insurance plan to provide its female employees 
with the same hospitalization benefits for pregnancy-related conditions 
as were provided for other medical conditions. Employees' spouses, 
however, received pregnancy-related benefits that were less extensive 
than the benefits received by spouses for other disabilities.3 A male 
employee filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC),4 alleging that the employer's refusal to provide 
full insurance coverage for pregnancy-related hospitalization for his 
wife violated EEOC guidelines interpreting the PDA.5 The employer 
I. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1980). The text of the PDA in pertinent 
part states that: 
The terms 'because of' or 'on the basis of' sex include, but are not lim-
ited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work .... 
Id. at § 2000e(k). 
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, appears at §§ 701-
716. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
Section 703(a)(i) of Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(i) (1982), 
and states that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin." Id. 
Section 703(a)(ii) of Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(ii) (1982), 
and states that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to 
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Id. 
3. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2622-23 
(1983). 
4. The EEOC was established to interpret and administer Title VII. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-4 to -5 (1976). In addition to investigating charges of discrimination, id. 
§ 2000e-5(b), and bringing civil actions in federal court to compel compliance 
with Title VII, id. § 2000e-5(f)(i), the EEOC publishes guidelines reflecting the 
Agency's interpretation of the controlling statutes. I d. § 2000e-5(e). These guide-
lines, while not having the force oflaw, are entitled to consideration by the courts. 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). 
5. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2626 
(1983). After passage of the PDA, and before the effective date of the employer's 
plan, the EEOC issued interpretive guidelines in the form of questions and an-
swers. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1982). The answers to questions 21 and 22 re-
flected the EEOC's position on employee spousal pregnancy. Essentially, these 
168 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 14 
then challenged the EEOC's guidelines in federal district court, and the 
EEOC, in tum, filed suit against the employer alleging sex discrimina-
tion against male employees in the employer's provision of benefits. 
The district court dismissed the EEOC's complaint, holding that the 
PDA applied only to female employees and not to spouses of male em-
ployees. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit reversed, finding that the plan provided less inclusive spousal 
benefits to male employees and thus discriminated against males.7 Af-
ter rehearing en bane, the court's decision was affirmed.8 The Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that the pregnancy limitation in the employer's 
amended plan discriminated against male employees in violation of Ti-
tle VII, because the plan gave full spousal benefits to female employees, 
but only partial coverage to male employees simply because of their 
sex.9 The Court reasoned that Congress, in enacting the PDA, over-
turned the holding of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 10 that the exclu-
sion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a health insurance plan did 
not constitute sex discrimination. Additionally, the Court continued, 
Congress rejected the reasoning of Gilbert that differential treatment of 
pregnancy is not gender-based discrimination. II 
Sex discrimination in the United States has a long, well-docu-
mented history. I2 While the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment 13 and the due process clause of the fifth amendment I4 safe-
answers posited that an employer who provides dependent medical benefits must 
cover the spouses of both males and females equally, including pregnancy-related 
expenses. Id. § 1604, app. at 140. 
6. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 510 F. Supp. 66,71 (E.D. 
Va. 1981), rev'd, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), affdpercuriam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 
1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983). 
7. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 451 (4th 
Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983). 
8. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 113, 114 (4th 
Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983). 
9. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2627 
(1983). 
10. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
II. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2627 
(1983). Under Gilbert, for discrimination to be gender-based and thus violative of 
Title VII, the line between the favored and the disfavored groups must be drawn 
strictly on the basis of gender: male versus female. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137-38. 
Gilbert further held that pregnancy was not a sex-based attribute, but merely an 
additional risk peculiar to females, and that to compensate for this risk would give 
females an additional benefit. Id. at 139. 
12. See generally Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877 (1967); Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: 
An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 
671. 
13. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. 
CoNsT. amend. XIV,§ l. 
14. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall ... be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw .... " U.S. CoNsT. 
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guard against discrimination, their protection is limited to barring dis-
criminatory practices of a state or of the federal government. In the 
wake of the civil violence of the early 1960's, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act15 was passed in 1964 barring, for the first time in the public 
sector, discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. 16 The essen-
tial purpose of Title VII is to protect an individual from being treated 
differently simply because he or she is a member of a sex-defined 
group. 17 Title VII's underlying policy - fairness to the individual 
rather than fairness to a class 18 - is implemented in part by prohibit-
ing discrimination with resrect to compensation, terms, privileges, or 
conditions of employment. 1 While the statute itself speaks in terms of 
"compensation," courts have accepted that for Title VII purposes, total 
compensation includes fringe benefits, 20 and that Title VII's protection 
of fringe benefits applies equally to male and female employees?' 
While Title VII was clearly intended to eliminate discrimination in 
employment based upon sex, the parameters of the term "sex" were not 
delineated in Title VII, and it was uncertain whether differential treat-
ment based upon pregnancy was to be equated with sex discrimina-
amend. V. The due process clause of the fifth amendment has been interpreted to 
bar discrimination by the federal government. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 
500 (1954). 
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
16. See supra note 2. For purposes of Title VII, "employer" is defined as a person 
"engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees 
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) 
(1982). Title VII was amended in 1972 to cover state and local governments. ld 
§ 2000e(a)-(b) (Supp. III 1973). 
17. See, e.g., Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976) (male 
employee challenged retirement benefits); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (male employee may allege sex discrimination in retirement benefits), 
rev'd on other grounds, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, 442 
F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (male challenged company's policy of using only females as 
flight attendants), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Developments in the Law-
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. 
L. REv. 1109, 1172-74 (1971). 
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). This policy was articulated in Los Angeles 
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-11 (1978). Relying on 
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
991 (1971), the Court in Manhart adopted as a fundamental principle ofTitle VII 
the premise that employment decisions cannot be predicated upon stereotypical 
assumptions about characteristics of males or females. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707. 
For a discussion of the principles established by Manhart, see Comment, Title VII 
and Sex Discrimination, 3 GLENDALE L. REv. 141, 153-54 (1979). 
19. See supra note 2 for pertinent text of Title VII. 
20. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1978); Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896 
(7th Cir. 1973); Pedraya v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936 
(D. Colo. 1979). 
21. See EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978); Rosen v. Public Serv. 
Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973). 
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tion.22 In its formal 1972 guidelines, however, the EEOC took the 
position that an employment practice that discriminates on the basis of 
pregnancy is a prima facie violation of Title VII. 23 During the next four 
years, these guidelines were generally adhered to by federal courts ad-
dressing this issue.24 
The Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,25 
however, sharply reversed this trend in the case law.26 In Gilbert, wo-
men employees alleged that their company's disability plan discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII, because the plan 
provided sickness and accident benefits, but excluded from coverage 
disabilities resulting from ~regnancyY The Supreme Court rejected 
the 1972 EEOC guidelines, 8 and held that this exclusion did not con-
stitute sex-based discrimination under Title VII.29 In reaching this de-
cision, the Court noted that Congress had not defined "discrimination" 
in Title VII.30 The Court, therefore, looked to the concept of discrimi-
nation as it had developed in equal protection analysis, reasoning that 
both this analysis and Title VII were intended to alleviate similar 
concems.31 
As a starting point in developing its Title VII analysis, the Gilbert 
Court found instructive a factually similar equal protection clause case. 
In Geduldig v. Aiello,32 a California state disability plan that excluded 
pregnancy-related disabilities was found to be constitutional. The 
Geduldig Court reasoned that since the plan drew a line between "preg-
nant women and non-pregnant persons," it did not discriminate on the 
basis of sex, as the latter group contained both males and females. 33 
The Court declared that the program did "not exclude anyone from 
22. See Note, Fourth Circuit Review-Employee Pregnancies, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
620, 621 (1980). The uncertainty concerning employee pregnancies can be attrib-
uted in part to the stereotypes associated with females, who were seen as tempo-
rary workers, and in part to the lack of legislative history of the sex provision of 
Title VII. Id. at 621 n.4. 
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973). 
24. See Comment, Spousal Benefits and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 13 
SETON HALL L. REv. 323, 327 (1983); see, e.g., Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 
F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), affd in part, vacated in part, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Gilbert 
v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); 
Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976). 
25. 429 u.s. 125 (1976). 
26. See Barkett, Pregnancy Discrimination--Purpose, Effect and Nashville Gas Co. v. 
Satty, 16 J. FAM. L. 401, 413-33 (1978); Comment, supra note 24, at 327. 
27. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 127-28. 
28. Id. at 142-45. The Court determined that the EEOC guidelines had only limited 
authority, were not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, and were con-
tradictory to both earlier EEOC guidelines and to § 703(h) of Title VII (Equal 
Pay Act). 
29. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46. 
30. Id at 133. 
31. Id. 
32. 417 u.s. 484 (1974). 
33. Id. at 497 n.20. 
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benefit eligibility because of gender, but merely remove[ d) one physical 
condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities."34 
The Gilbert Court relied primarily on a footnote in the Geduldig 
opinion, which it interpreted as showing that pregnancy exclusions in 
disability plans do not discriminate on the basis of sex.35 The Gilbert 
Court stressed that there was no risk from which men were protected 
by the plan and women were not, 36 and reiterated Geduldigs emphasis 
on the division of the plan's recipients into groups of "pregnant women 
and non-pregnant persons.'037 The Court determined that since the 
benefit plan covered the same categories of disabilities equally for both 
sexes, it did not discriminate on the basis of sex.38 Finding that preg-
nancy was not a sex-based attribute, but merely an additional risk pe-
culiar to women, the Gilbert Court felt that to reimburse female 
employees for pregnancy-related disabilities would give them an unfair 
benefit in violation of Title VII.39 In a strong dissent, however, Justice 
Brennan rejected the majority's characterization of the pregnancy ex-
clusion as gender-neutral, arguing that a pregnancy-based distinction 
was "strongly sex-related.''40 He was similarly dissatisfied with the 
classification of pregnancy as an additional risk.41 
Congressional response42 to Gilbert came in the form of the PDA, 
which broadened the meaning of "sex discrimination" under Title VII 
34. Id. at 496 n.20. 
35. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-35; see Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. 
36. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138. 
37. Id. at 135. 
38. Id. at 138. 
39. Id. at 138-39. 
40. Id. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
41. Id. at 151-53. 
42. Judicial response to Gilbert is exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). In Satty, an employer required 
pregnant employees to take a leave of absence, during which the employee was 
not entitled to sick pay and lost all accumulated job seniority. Id. at 137. The 
Court held that the denial of sick pay was not violative of Title VII, as the pro-
gram was "legally indistinguishable" from the disability plan upheld in Gilbert. 
Id. at 143. The seniority program, however, was found to be prima facie violative 
of Title VII. The Court, using a benefit/burden analysis, reasoned that although, 
under Gilbert, section 703(a)(i) of Title VII did not require the extension of greater 
fringe benefits to women, section 703(a)(ii) similarly does not permit burdening 
women by limiting the availability of employment opportunities. Id. at 141-42; 
see supra note 2 for text of§ 703(a)(i)-(ii). The Court, other than claiming that the 
difference between the denial of benefits and the imposition of a burden is "more 
than one of semantics," provided no guidance in how to distinguish between the 
two. Salty, 434 U.S. at 142. Thus, after Salty, differential treatment of preg-
nancy-related disabilities was sometimes violative of Title VII and sometimes not, 
a paradox evident throughout subsequent litigation in this field. See Allen & 
Powers, Sex Discrimination-Court Narrows Gilbert-Some Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation is Sex Related, 27 BUFF. L. REv. 295 (1978). Mitchell v. Board of Trustees 
of Pickens County School Dist., 599 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965 
(1979), exemplifies the confusion created by Satty in the Fourth Circuit. For a 
discussion of Mitchell, see Note, Fourth Circuit Review-Employee Pregnancies, 37 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 620 (1980). 
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to include differential treatment of an individual "because of or on the 
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."43 Thus, 
Congress expressly made discrimination on the basis of pregnancy an 
unlawful employment practice under Title VII, and accordingly, an 
employee's pregnancy must be treated the same as any other disability 
under a fringe benefit program. 
The issue of whether differential treatment of spousal pregnancz 
benefits would violate Title VII, however, remained unsettled. 
Neither the legislative history of the PDA, nor case law subsequent to 
the Act, clearly established whether differential treatment of spousal 
pregnancy benefits was precluded by the PDA. The legislative history 
of the PDA is contradictory and inconclusive, lending support both to 
the proposition that exclusion of spousal pregnancy benefits violates 
Title VII, and to the proposition that it does not.45 Construing nearly 
identical benefit plans, four federal district courts held that the exclu-
sion of spousal pregnancy benefits did not violate Title VII,46 while one 
held that it did.47 
43. See supra note 1 for the pertinent text of the PDA. 
44. Outside the ambit of pregnancy benefits, the issue of spousal benefits had been 
squarely met, and courts had uniformly found that disparity in the provision of 
spousal benefits based on the sex of the employee violates Title VII. See 
Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Colby 
College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1146 (1st Cir. 1978); Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas 
Co., 477 F.2d 90, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1973). Similarly, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that federal statutes providing less comprehensive fringe benefits to 
spouses of female workers than to spouses of male workers discriminate against 
the female worker in violation of the equal protection clause. See Califano v. 
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207-08 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 
646-47 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-99 (1973). 
45. For legislative materials suggesting that the PDA was not intended to cover 
spousal benefits, see SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 
AcT OF 1978, at 200-01 (Comm. Print 1980) (remarks of Senator Harrison Wil-
liams); 123 CoNG. REc. 29,648 (1977) (remarks by Senator Williams on Act's im-
pact on Income Maintenance Plans). For materials suggesting that the PDA was 
intended to include spousal benefits, see 123 CoNG. REc. 29,642, 29,663 (1977) 
(remarks of Senators Bayh and Cranston); Proposed Amendment to Title VI/ qfthe 
Civil Rights Act ofl964: Hearings on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Sub-
comm. on Employment Opportunities qfthe House Comm. on Education and Labor, 
95th Cong., lst Sess. 187-88 (1977) (remarks of Congressmen Weiss and Sarasin); 
Discrimination on the Basis o/ Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., lst Sess. 
28, 51-52 (1977) (statement of DrewS. Days, III, Assistant Att'y Gen. Civil Rights 
Division Just. Dept.). For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the 
PDA, see Comment, supra note 24, at 333-36. 
46. EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982); EEOC v. Joslyn 
Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 706 F.2d 1469 (7th 
Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 1209 (N.D. Cal. 19.81), aff'd, 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982); Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 510 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd, 
667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. 
Ct. 2622 (1983). 
47. United Teachers-Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., CV 81-2121 Lew 
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Similarly, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth,48 
Seventh,49 and Ninth5° Circuits heard the issue of differential treatment 
of spousal pregnancy on appeal, but reached opposing results. First, 
finding that the benefit plan gave fewer benefits to male than to female 
employees and therefore violated Title VII, the Fourth Circuit looked 
to the language of the PDA.51 The court found that since spousal cov-
erage is employment-related, and since the statutory language did not 
indicate such coverage falls outside the reach of the statute, the lan-
guage indicated congressional intent to apply the PDA to all employ-
ment situations.52 The Fourth Circuit buttressed its decision by noting 
that the PDA refers to "persons" and not to "employees."53 The Sev-
enth and Ninth Circuits, however, determined that the PDA's language 
indicated congressional intent to protect only female workers and, ac-
cordingly, found that the plans did not discriminate based on sex.54 
Furthermore, while all three courts acknowledged that the issue of 
spousal pregnancy benefits was to be decided on "existing Title VII 
principles," there was no consensus as to what these principles were. 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, consistent with their findings that the 
PDA merely carved out a narrow exception to Gilbert for female em-
ployees, found that the principles established by Gilbert were left in-
tact. 55 The Fourth Circuit, however, determined that there was no 
support for the view that the matter should be decided on the basis of 
Title VII as it existed before the PDA, and applied Title VII as 
amended by the PDA.56 The employer's plan was unlawful since the 
PDA expressly equated pregnancy-related conditions with sex and the 
(Gx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1982) (trial court decision), affd, 712 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
48. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), 
affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983). 
49. EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 706 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1983). 
50. EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982). 
51. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 450 (4th 
Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983); 
see American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (in Title VII cases, 
starting point must be the language employed by Congress; legislative purpose is 
determined by the ordinary meaning of the words used). 
52. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 450 (4th 
Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d ll3 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983). 
53. /d. at 451. 
54. EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 706 F.2d 1469, 1476 (7th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. 
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1982). 
55. EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 706 F.2d 1469, 1477-78 (7th Cir. 1983); 
EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). 
The basic principles established by Gilbert were that the dividing line between 
favored and disfavored groups must be drawn strictly on the td.Sis of gender to 
constitute sex discrimination and, hence, that a division into groups of pregnant 
women and non-pregnant persons is not discriminatory. See supra notes II & 35-
39 and accompanying text. 
56. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 451 (4th 
Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d ll3 (4th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983). 
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plan contained a pregnancy-based, and hence sex-based, distinction in 
its provision of benefits. 57 
Recognizing this conflict, the Supreme Court heard on appeal the 
Fourth Circuit case, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 
EEOC.58 The Supreme Court adopted a two-tiered approach in its 
analysis of whether the denial of spousal pregnancy benefits discrimi-
nated against males in violation of Title VII. The Court first found that 
the PDA did not create merely a narrow exception to Gilbert, but 
rather, that it completely overruled the Gilbert rationale that pregnancy 
is an additional risk to which only women are liable and that preg-
nancy discrimination is not sex-based.59 The Court emphasized con-
gressional dissatisfaction with the Gilbert decision. It noted in 
particular those sections of the PDA's legislative history indicating con-
gressional approval of the Gilbert dissent's view that pregnancy dis-
crimination is sex-based discrimination.60 In light of this legislative 
history, the Court found it anomalous that Congress would view an 
employee's pregnancy as sex-based, but a spouse's pregnancy as gen-
der-neutral.61 
In the second tier of its analysis, the Court examined the meaning 
of discrimination under Title VII, without its Gilbert gloss. 62 The Court 
first noted that compensation for Title VII purposes includes fringe 
benefits such as insurance coverage, 63 and that both sexes are protected 
against discrimination.64 Stressing those sections of the legislative his-
tory that enunciated the necessity of reestablishing the principles of Ti-
tle VII that had existed prior to the Gilbert decision, the Court held that 
Gilbert's interpretation of Title VII principles was completely over-
ruled.65 The Court then determined that Title VII principles existing 
prior to Gtlbert provided the appropriate test of discrimination under 
Title VII. These principles, as developed in Los Angeles Department of 
Water & Power v. Manhart,66 included a test of discrimination that 
would hold invalid a plan treating one person in a manner that, but for 
57. ld. 
58. 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983). 
59. ld. at 2627. 
60. I d. at 2628. It should be noted that both the Senate and House Reports concluded 
that the EEOC's 1972 guidelines correctly interpreted sex discrimination for Title 
VII purposes, S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 
948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. 
NEws 4750, and that Gilbert's dissent accurately interpreted Title VII's sex dis-
crimination provisions. S. REP. at 3-4; H.R. REP. at 4-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4752-53. The Senate Report stressed that the 
spousal benefit question was to be resolved on the basis of existing Title VII prin-
ciples. S. REP. at 4. It did not, however, enunciate what these principles were. 
61. Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2629. 
62. ld. at 2630. 
63. ld. 
64. ld. 
65. Id. at 2629-30. 
66. 435 U.S. 702 (1978); see supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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that person's sex, would be different. 67 The Court determined that pro-
viding less extensive pregnancy benefits for spouses gives married male 
employees a less inclusive benefit package than that given to married 
female employees. Such a plan, reasoned the Court, would not pass the 
test of discrimination enunciated in Manhart, since for no reason other 
than the employee's sex, a married female employee received full 
spousal coverage, while the married male employee did not.68 
The Court dismissed the employer's argument that Title VII ap-
plies only to discrimination against employees and not spouses, finding 
that since pregnancy is definitively a sex-based attribute for all Title 
VII purposes, discrimination based on pregnancy is, on its face, sex 
discrimination.69 Thus, concluded the Court, if spouses receive less 
favorable treatment in the provision of benefits, then the practice actu-
ally discriminates against employees who, accordingly, receive a less 
inclusive benefit package.70 
The dissent in Newport News, in accord with some of the lower 
court holdings/' argued that the language of the PDA indicated that it 
applies only to female employees, and that Gilbert's rationale was left 
otherwise intact by passage of the Act.72 Justices Rehnquist and Powell 
interpreted the legislative history of the PDA to exclude coverage of 
spousal benefits, and largely ignored those sections that expressed con-
gressional dissatisfaction with Gilbert's rationale.73 
Such an interpretation, however, would lead to an irrational result: 
for women employees, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy would 
be sex-based discrimination, while for employees' spouses, discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy would not be "gender-based discrimina-
tion at all."74 The view of the majority produces a more consistent 
result: pregnancy is a sex-based attribute, and pregnancy discrimina-
tion is therefore sex discrimination for all Title VII purposes. Further-
more, the Gilbert opinion left in its wake confusion concerning the 
principles of Title VIJ.15 If, however, as both the Senate and House 
reports on the PDA suggest, the Gilbert dissent accurately reflects the 
congressional viewpoint on Title VII principles, the reasoning of the 
Gilbert majority must have been legislatively eradicated by the PDA 
and with it G1lbert's own peculiar analysis of existing Title VII princi-
ples.76 Newport News replaces Gilbert's emphasis on groups of persons 
67. Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2630-31 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711). 
68. Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2630-31. 
69. /d. at 2631. 
70. /d. at 2631-32. 
71. See supra note 54. 
72. Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2632-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
73. /d. at 2636 n.7. 
74. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976). 
75. See supra notes 11, 18 & 42. 
76. See supra note 55. 
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with Manhart's focus on the individual as the underlying principle for 
Title VII analysis. 
The economic impact of extending coverage to employees' spouses 
is difficult to estimate, as there are currently no available studies on the 
extent to which employee medical plans exclude or limit spousal preg-
nancy benefits.77 Plainly, extending pregnancy benefits to dependent 
spouses will make more comprehensive insurance coverage available to 
greater numbers of women. Studies indicate, however, that the effect of 
applying the PDA to spouses may vary according to the socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of the women benefited so that groups already 
receiving a substantial amount of coverage would benefit most.78 It 
may, however, help to alleviate the unequal distribution of health in-
surance in the absence of a national health insurance plan. 79 More-
over, the Newport News opinion, although directed at discrimination 
against males, further weakens stereotypical views of the role of women 
in society.80 In addition to these social benefits, and perhaps of more 
general importance, Newport News reaffirms Title VII principles that 
emphasize the individual as the focus of Title VII legislation. 
Mari Stanley 
77. See Kohn, Can Men Be .Discriminated Against on the Basis o/ Pregnancy?: The 
Pregnancy .Discrimination Acto/ 1978 and its Application in Newport, 14 CoLUM. 
HuM. RTs. L. REv. 383, 424-27 (1983). 
78. Id at 427-29. 
79. Id at 428. 
80. See supra note 22; see also Comment, .D!!ferentia/ Treatment o/ Pregnancy in Em-
ployment: The Impact ofGenera1 Elec. Co. v. Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co. v. 
Satty, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 717, 724 (1978) (Gilbert Court sees child-rear-
ing, and not employment, as woman's proper role); Comment, Title V/1· Are Ex-
ceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 13 TuLSA L.J. 102, 124 (1977) (Court relies on sex-
role stereotypes of women as weak and vulnerable because of their reproductive 
functions). 
